Lecture 1 · Part A — The Four Principles and How to Read an Argument
An Introduction to Bioethics.
A 34-year-old woman is brought in after a high-speed crash. She was awake and talking at the scene. Now she is pale and drifting — she opens her eyes when you say her name, but cannot follow a question. A scan shows her spleen is badly torn and bleeding internally; she has lost close to half her blood in the last hour.
The surgeon wants to operate now, with donated blood on the way in. In her wallet is a card, signed and dated: she is a Jehovah’s Witness and refuses all blood products. Her parents say she is not thinking clearly and would never have wanted to die like this. You are the nurse at her bedside.

In chart shorthand: a grade IV splenic laceration, hemoglobin down from 13 to 7 in an hour. Translated — a deep tear in the spleen, and a blood count that has fallen by nearly half in the time you have been on shift.
Note
Two questions are tangled together here. May a person refuse a transfusion? That one is close to settled: U.S. courts have almost always upheld a competent adult’s refusal, even a fatal one. Is this her refusal? That is not settled at all. In an emergency a team may treat without consent, on the presumption that people want to be saved — and a card like hers exists precisely to rebut that presumption in advance.
Capacity is also not something a person simply has or lacks. It is specific to one decision at one moment, and it can drain away with a blood pressure and return after surgery. Minors and pregnancy are the other two places the law gets hard; we return to all three later in the course.
Don’t try to settle this yet. The rest of the lecture is, in a sense, equipping you to answer it more carefully than “follow your gut.” Write down your first instinct now, and check at the end of the chapter whether it moved.
By the end of Part A, you will be able to:
You will also be able to:
Bioethics is the systematic study of ethical questions arising in:
“Systematic” is the load-bearing word. Bioethics isn’t just having opinions — it’s reasoning about them in a way others can examine, challenge, and refine.
A short list of mid-20th-century shocks:
Bioethics is what grew up to answer the question: how should we govern this?
Notice the scales. Same field, three very different sizes of question — one bedside, one study, one society. Keep asking which scale a problem lives on; it often decides which principle carries the most weight.
“Ethics” names three different activities, not one:
| Branch | The question it asks | How it works |
|---|---|---|
| Descriptive ethics | What do people actually believe and do? | Surveys, history, sociology, psychology |
| Metaethics | What are moral claims — true? objective? just feelings? | Conceptual and logical analysis |
| Normative ethics | What ought we to do, and why? | Reasoned argument, principles, theory |
Bioethics draws on all three — but its central job is normative.
Descriptive ethics — the empirical study of moral belief and behavior. It reports; it does not prescribe.
Metaethics — steps back to ask about morality itself.
Note
Bioethics uses descriptive facts (you cannot weigh a harm you have not measured) and usually brackets metaethics — clinicians must act before philosophy settles whether morality is “objective.”
Normative ethics asks which actions, policies, and characters are right — and what reasons support that. It works at two levels:
| Level | What it does | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Theoretical | Builds general accounts of rightness | Utilitarianism, Kantian ethics (Part B) |
| Practical / applied | Brings moral norms into a real domain | Bioethics, business ethics, environmental ethics |
It is easy to confuse ethical, legal, religious, and preference claims. They often point the same direction, and in ordinary speech we slide between them without noticing. They are importantly different, and telling them apart is one of the first skills bioethics asks for.
| Type of claim | Source of authority | Question it answers |
|---|---|---|
| Ethical | Reasons we can examine and share | What ought we to do? |
| Legal | Statutes, courts, regulators | What may or must we do under law? |
| Religious | Sacred texts, traditions, communities | What does this faith require? |
| Preference | Personal taste | What do I happen to want? |
The law is not a reliable guide to what is ethical.
Tip
A useful test for nurses: “Is it legal?” and “Is it the right thing for this patient?” are two different questions. Sometimes the law lags behind ethics; sometimes it overreaches.
Many of our patients — and many of you — draw moral guidance from religious tradition. That is appropriate. But:
We will treat religious commitments as important data about what patients value — not as conversation-stoppers in clinical reasoning.
“I just don’t think it’s right.”
That is a feeling, not yet an argument. Ethical reasoning asks the next question: why? What reason, that another reasonable person could weigh, supports the conclusion?
“I feel” and “I believe” are perfectly good starting points. Bioethics just asks for the next step: the reason someone who doesn’t share your feeling could still weigh.
Come up with your own examples, not ones from these slides.
A nurse on the L&D floor is asked to assist with a second-trimester abortion for a patient whose fetus has a lethal anomaly. The procedure is legal; her own physician is performing it. The nurse declines on religious grounds and asks to be reassigned. Her hospital has a conscience clause — a policy permitting clinicians to opt out of specific procedures — and she has invoked it formally.
Note
Where the duty actually lands. Most U.S. conscience-clause laws place the duty to still care for the patient on the institution, not on the individual clinician. That shifts the question from “can she refuse?” to “what does the institution owe the patient when she does?”
Beauchamp & Childress, 1979 — the working framework of clinical ethics for almost fifty years.
In the wake of Tuskegee, a U.S. national commission produced the Belmont Report (1979) (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979). That same year, philosophers Tom Beauchamp and James Childress published Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Beauchamp and Childress 2019), proposing four principles meant to be:
The result is what’s often called principlism — and it remains the lingua franca of hospital ethics consults (Jonsen 1998).
Beauchamp and Childress did not invent a new morality. They drew the four principles out of the common morality.
I call it “fourth-grade morality” — the rules a thoughtful ten-year-old already follows.
Norms almost no one seriously rejects — and what each becomes in medicine:
| Rule a child already knows | In the clinic it becomes… |
|---|---|
| “Ask first; don’t push people around” | Autonomy |
| “Help people who are hurt” | Beneficence |
| “Don’t hurt people” | Non-maleficence |
| “Share fairly; no favorites” | Justice |
| “Don’t lie; keep your promises” | Truth-telling, consent, fidelity |
Note
This is why the four principles are a starting point, not an answer key. The real work — coming next — is turning shared general norms into a decision in one specific case.
Autonomy — self-rule. Respect the patient’s right to make informed decisions about her own body and care.
In practice, autonomy underwrites:

The transfusion-refusal case that opened this chapter is, at its core, an autonomy case — and a hard one, because the person whose autonomy is at stake cannot speak for herself right now. Hold that thought — you’ll meet it again in Chapter 2 and in the Dax Cowart case study.
Autonomy self-rule
The case. A 28-year-old with type-1 diabetes (A1c 11.2) declines an insulin pump for the third time. She is tired of being told what to do.
What respecting autonomy looks like here:
Autonomy is the floor. It does not require us to abandon her — only not to override her.
Beneficence — do good. Act in the patient’s best interest; promote welfare.
This sounds obvious until you ask: whose account of the patient’s good?
Then ask how many people’s good. Read narrowly, beneficence covers this patient; read broadly — as utilitarians do — it covers welfare in the aggregate, which is where public health and cost-effectiveness arguments get their force.
Beneficence and autonomy can pull in opposite directions.

Beneficence do good
The case. An 82-year-old with end-stage heart failure, fifth admission this year. The team recommends comfort-focused care; he wants “everything done.” His daughter asks the team to “talk him out of it.”
Whose idea of his good?
Beneficence is not the same as paternalism. It is the discipline of finding out what this person counts as a life worth living — and acting in service of that.
Non-maleficence — first, do no harm (primum non nocere).
The oldest principle in Western medicine, traceable to the Hippocratic tradition (5th c. BCE). It does not mean “never do anything risky.” It means: weigh the harms, and don’t expose patients to harm without proportionate benefit.
Every chemotherapy regimen, every surgery, every medication is a deliberate small harm in service of a larger good.

Hippocrates, engraving by Peter Paul Rubens. Public domain (Wikimedia Commons).
Non-Maleficence do no harm
The case. A new chemotherapy regimen offers a 30% chance of remission and a 5% chance of fatal cardiotoxicity. Standard care offers neither.
The principle does not say “never harm.” It asks:
Every IV start is a small puncture wound. Every medication has side effects. The principle’s job is to forbid hidden, gratuitous, or disproportionate risk — not all risk.

Justice — fair distribution of benefits and burdens.
In bioethics, justice shows up in three main forms:

Justice gets a whole chapter of its own later (Chapter 8). For now just plant the flag: bioethics is not only about the encounter between one clinician and one patient.
Justice treat fairly
The case. Two 55-year-olds arrive in the ED with chest pain and no obvious red flags. One is on Medicaid; the other has private insurance. Decades of research show that, on average, they will not get the same workup.
Justice at the bedside is rarely a kidney allocation decision. It looks like:
Justice asks us to look up from the individual patient and notice the pattern.
Autonomy Respect her choices about her own body and care. Whose call is this?
Beneficence Promote welfare — hers, and sometimes other people’s too. Who does this help?
Non-Maleficence Do not impose harm without proportionate benefit. Who could this hurt?
Justice Distribute benefits, burdens, and access fairly. Who else has a claim?
A framework, not an algorithm: the four tell you what to weigh, not how much each weighs. Every one of them is also a question about who, and none of the four settles on its own how far its own concern reaches.
Prima facie (“at first sight”) — a principle is binding unless, in this case, it is outweighed by a stronger competing principle. None of the four is absolute.
Balancing — the deliberate weighing of competing principles in the situation in front of you.
Disciplined balancing. Before letting principle X override principle Y, you should be able to say:
Example: warning one named, seriously threatened person can meet these conditions; announcing a patient’s diagnosis “just to be safe” cannot.
Specification — narrowing a broad principle into concrete, action-guiding rules for particular contexts.
| Specified through… | “Respect autonomy” becomes… |
|---|---|
| Law | The right to refuse treatment; informed-consent statutes |
| Institutional policy | The hospital’s consent form and capacity workflow |
| Professional codes | Nursing confidentiality and scope-of-practice duties |
| Clinical protocol | When a second clinician must confirm capacity |
Your turn. Take “respect autonomy” and specify it once more: write one concrete rule a specific unit could actually post on the wall.
Most — though not all — people accept the common morality. So deep disagreement in bioethics is usually not good vs. evil. It has four main sources:
| Source | What is really in dispute | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Facts | The empirical situation | “How likely is this harm?” |
| Balancing | How to weigh shared norms here | Autonomy vs. beneficence in a refusal |
| Specification | Which concrete rule the norm becomes | What counts as informed consent |
| Deep value clash | A real disagreement at the margins | The moral status of an embryo |
Naming the source is the first move: a factual dispute is resolved very differently from a values dispute.
Example. Two patients, one ICU bed, equal need. Choosing is not “solving” it — the patient not chosen was still owed care. The residue you feel is appropriate, not irrational.
Most interesting bioethics cases are conflicts between principles, not conflicts between good and evil. Four collisions you will meet all semester:
The four principles do not resolve these tensions. They make them visible so we can argue about them carefully.
Think of a situation from clinical, work, family, or the news in which two of these four principles pulled against each other.
Return to our trauma-bay patient — a signed refusal, a patient who cannot confirm it, parents at the door. Now you have vocabulary for what was hard.
Note
Harm is not a fixed quantity. It depends on whose life it is. The same act changes category depending on whose account of her good you use. Transfusing her rescues a body and overrides a person. Honoring the card respects a person and loses a body. Both descriptions are accurate, and that is the difficulty— not a trick of wording.
This is why the principles do not settle cases. They give us shared language for arguing about which description of the act is the one that matters here.
A skill we will use in every remaining lecture.
An argument, in philosophy, is not a quarrel. It is a structured piece of reasoning:
The job of the careful reader: find the conclusion first, then the premises, then ask whether the premises are true and whether they actually support the conclusion.
A short argument you might hear on the floor:
“We have to transfuse her — she’ll die otherwise, and our job is to save lives.”
Sounds airtight — until you notice what’s missing. That argument quietly assumes:
Each of those is contestable. Surfacing hidden assumptions is half the work of bioethics.
A fallacy is an error in reasoning — an argument that looks like good support but isn’t.
The next two slides cover the six you will see most often.
Appeal to Nature Inferring that something is good (or bad) merely because it is natural (or unnatural). “IVF lets older women conceive — but it’s unnatural, so it must be wrong.”
Slippery Slope Predicting that allowing X will inevitably lead to a much worse Y, without showing how the slide actually happens. “If we permit medical aid in dying for the terminally ill, we’ll end up euthanizing the disabled.”
Ad Hominem Attacking the person making the argument rather than the argument itself. “You can’t take Peter Singer seriously on animal ethics — he holds a lot of unpopular views.”
Naturalistic Fallacy Inferring an ought directly from an is — that what happens in nature shows what should happen morally. “Humans evolved as omnivores, therefore eating meat is morally permissible.”
False Dichotomy Framing a complex issue as if there were only two options, when others exist. “Either we let the market ration health care, or the system will collapse.”
Appeal to Authority Treating the testimony of an authority as decisive even when they speak outside their expertise — or when other experts disagree. “My favorite podcaster says vaccines cause autism, and he has done a lot of research.”
Name the fallacy in each, then say what has actually gone wrong in the reasoning.
Naming the fallacy is the easy half. The half that matters is saying why the premises fail to support the conclusion — and remembering that a bad argument can still have a true conclusion.
Think of one argument about health you have actually heard — from family, a provider, a patient, or social media.
Bioethics is the systematic study of moral questions in medicine, research, and policy. It is mostly applied normative ethics — distinct from descriptive and metaethical inquiry, and not the same as law, religion, or personal preference. The four principles — autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, justice — are an explication of the common morality we already share, made usable through balancing and specification, and they give us a shared vocabulary for the conflicts we’ll see all semester. And every claim in this course will be evaluated as an argument: premises, conclusion, hidden assumptions, possible fallacies.
In Part B, we ask the next question: where do these principles come from? We meet the major ethical theories — utilitarian, Kantian, virtue, and care — that ground and sometimes contest the four principles.
All uncredited slide illustrations and scenario visualizations were generated using Gemini.
Write a brief answer to each, or use them as discussion prompts.
Recall
What is the difference between descriptive ethics, normative ethics, and metaethics, and why is bioethics usually classified as applied normative ethics?
Apply
May a doctor refuse — on personal grounds — to even discuss medical aid in dying with a patient who asks about it? Which two of the four principles are most in tension in this case?
Debate
In a pluralistic hospital, should policy be justified only with publicly shareable reasons that people across worldviews can assess, or is it legitimate to defend policy openly with religious reasons that not everyone accepts?
Bioethics OER · CC BY-NC 4.0 · Brendan Shea