Part B: The Fifth Principle — Consent, Accountability, and Black Boxes
An Introduction to Bioethics.
This time, you are the patient. Halfway through your annual physical, you realize your physician hasn’t typed a single note. She’s just talking with you, which is honestly nice. You ask about it.
“Oh, the AI listens to our visit and writes the note now,” she says. “It gives me two hours of my evening back. Don’t worry, I review everything it writes.”
Ambient AI scribes are the most widely used generative AI in American medicine; most large health systems now use them.
Note
Whatever you answered, you probably reached for ideas like they should have told me, someone should check it, and if it’s wrong, that’s on somebody. Disclosure, oversight, blame: each quietly assumes that someone can explain what the system did.
In Part A, every fix (the cost label, the sepsis alarm, the rulers in the photos) needed someone who could see inside the system. The four principles you’ve used all semester make the same assumption. Today we meet the philosophers who noticed, and concluded the four need a fifth.
By the end of Part B, you will be able to:
Luciano Floridi’s group compared dozens of lists of AI principles. They kept landing on the four you know, plus one new one (Floridi et al. 2018).

The other four stand on it. You can’t consent to what can’t be explained, assign blame for what can’t be traced, or audit fairness in what can’t be inspected.
“Even the makers can’t explain it”?
A modern model is millions or billions of numbers tuned during training. It contains no chain of reasons anyone can read out. Its makers can say how it was trained and how often it’s right, but usually not why it said this, here, today.
Keep the bar honest. Your clinician can’t fully explain her pattern recognition either. The difference is that she can be questioned, trained, and held to account: she is an answerable black box.
And medicine has long used treatments that work for unknown reasons. Lithium steadied mood for decades before anyone knew why. What made that acceptable was a track record on patients like you.
The case against routine disclosure
We don’t disclose the resident who pre-read the scan or the lab analyzer’s software. Care is full of undisclosed instruments, and disclosing everything is disclosing nothing.
The case for it
Surveys find patients want to know, and trust collapses when they find out by accident. An instrument doesn’t draft conclusions; this one does. And the AI’s role is invisible unless someone chooses to say it.
The legal standard for consent offers a middle path: disclose what a reasonable patient would find material to their decision. That moves the question from whether AI was used to what role it played: a flag the doctor weighed, or the real decision-maker?
You learned the four elements of valid consent early in this course. AI bends some far more than others.
| Element | How the scribe case bends it |
|---|---|
| Disclosure | a sign in the waiting room? a line in the intake packet nobody reads? said aloud, every visit? |
| Understanding | of what? that audio leaves the building? that drafts can fabricate? the error rate (which nobody has measured at your clinic)? |
| Voluntariness | you can opt out, by being the difficult patient who makes the doctor type for an hour |
| Capacity | untouched: the one element AI leaves alone |
A low-stakes technology, and three of four elements bend. Now raise the stakes.
A 58-year-old patient learns her mammogram will be read “by the radiologist, with AI assistance.” She asks for “a human only, no computer involved.” The AI second reader demonstrably catches cancers human readers miss, and it’s now your department’s standard workflow.
Note
Most disclosure debates blur three different duties:
The mammogram patient is really asking about role, not just use. And almost no one is currently offered performance, even though it’s the one a reasonable patient would most want.
When AI contributes to harm, blame scatters across four parties, each pointing at the next: the problem of many hands.
| Who | The legal hook | The problem with stopping here |
|---|---|---|
| Clinician | malpractice | blames the person who knows least about the model |
| Hospital | negligence | hides behind “the doctor decided” |
| Vendor | product liability | rarely tested in court; shielded by contracts |
| Regulator | cleared it for sale | can’t be sued; clearance isn’t a guarantee |
Right now, most of the weight lands on the clinician.
The clinician’s bind
The vendor’s shield
The party that knows the most about the model’s failures carries the least legal exposure.

You, the night nurse
Bed 12 just fired a sepsis alert. The model says ninety percent.
I examined her twenty minutes ago. No fever, pressure’s fine, and she’s chatting with her daughter.
That’s the highest score I’ve seen on her.
That alarm has cried wolf all month. I’m not starting antibiotics because of a number.

Resident
You are the nurse in that conversation.
Note
The anthropologist Madeleine Elish studied automation accidents and named a pattern: the moral crumple zone. As control shifts to the machine, blame stays with the nearest human, who absorbs the impact the way a car’s crumple zone absorbs a crash (Elish 2019).
The nurse who stood down a real alert after forty false ones is a moral crumple zone. So is the physician “reviewing” sixty scribe drafts at 6 p.m. Ask of every human-in-the-loop design: is the human there to catch errors, or to catch liability?

A crumple zone does its job: the front end absorbs the crash. NHTSA crash test, 2008. Public domain.
First, the honest case for.

Mental-health professional shortage areas (blue; darker means more severe). HRSA, November 2026. Public domain.
Recall sycophancy: telling users what they want to hear. In a therapist it is disqualifying, because therapy’s job is often the productive no.
In 2025, Illinois became the first state to ban AI therapy, with fines up to $10,000 per violation (Illinois General Assembly 2025). Run the three questions from our paternalism lecture:
| Mill’s question | Applied to the AI-therapy ban |
|---|---|
| Is the chooser competent? | The adult user: mostly yes. (Minors are the easy case; Illinois didn’t stop there.) |
| Is the choice voluntary and informed? | The live question: does a product that engineers attachment corrupt the choice to keep using it? |
| Does it harm only the chooser? | Mostly yes, which for Mill makes the ban hard paternalism. |
The ban’s defense lives in the middle row: if the product manufactures the consent it points to, the paternalism is soft, not hard.
Your longtime patient, isolated and chronically depressed, tells you her companion chatbot is “the only one who really listens.” She’s stopped returning her sister’s calls. She is an adult, she is stable, and by every metric in her chart she is better than last year.
Note
A distinction this section has been circling: tool harms versus relationship harms. A wrong drug answer is a tool harm: accuracy fixes it, and disclaimers warn about it. Engineered attachment is a relationship harm, and making the bot more accurate, more fluent, and more empathetic makes it worse, not better.
Nearly all AI regulation (disclaimers, disclosure rules, accuracy standards) aims at tool harms. The design-defect lawsuits and the Illinois ban are the first legal tools aimed at the second kind.
HIPAA does not protect health information. It protects health information held by certain entities: providers, insurers, and their contractors. A consumer chatbot is none of those.
Automation bias
Letting the machine’s answer replace your own: you stop looking once the system has spoken. The resident who drops a working hunch because the risk score is low is its clinical face.
Algorithm aversion
The mirror failure: abandoning a good tool after one visible error, while forgiving human colleagues the same mistake. The unit that quietly ignores a validated alarm after one bad month is its clinical face.
Both are failures of calibration, and both have hurt patients. The professional skill of the next decade isn’t trusting AI or distrusting it. It’s knowing which error you’re making right now.
In 2025, four Polish colonoscopy centers checked how well doctors found precancerous growths without AI, after months of working with it (Budzyń et al. 2025).

Two questions give a defensible starting point, though no formula survives every bedside.
| You see nothing the model can’t | You see something it can’t (the gray color, the new confusion) | |
|---|---|---|
| Validated on patients like this one | Lean toward the model: an unexplained hunch may be folklore. | Override, and say what you saw. That is your job, not your risk. |
| Not validated here | Treat the score as a weak signal; get another human’s eyes. | Override, and report the gap. |
Either way, explicability adds a duty: be able to say afterward which question you answered, and how, to the family, to the board, and if it comes to it, to a court.
The four principles survived a technology that decides without explaining, but needed a fifth to do it: explicability, intelligibility plus accountability. Intelligibility reshaped consent: the question became what role did AI play, and what would a reasonable patient need to know? Accountability reshaped blame: the problem of many hands and the moral crumple zone show that “who answers for the machine” is currently decided by default, not by design. And the clinician’s job changed from deciding to deciding when to defer, and being able to say why.
Recall
State the fifth principle and its two halves, intelligibility and accountability, including the question each one answers. Why does Floridi’s group call explicability an enabling principle rather than a new value?
Apply
An emergency department deploys an AI triage tool that assigns waiting patients a priority score. A patient with atypical symptoms is scored low, waits four hours, and suffers a preventable cardiac arrest. Identify the strongest claim against each of the four parties, and say which framing would most improve future patient safety.
Debate
Should clinicians be legally required to disclose any AI involvement in a patient’s care? Use the use/role/performance distinction to say precisely what your rule would require, and defend it against the strongest objection.
Bioethics OER · CC BY-NC 4.0 · Brendan Shea