
Part A: Gender-Affirming Care — Deciding Under Uncertainty
An Introduction to Bioethics.
Riley is 15. Assigned female at birth, Riley has identified as a boy for three years: socially transitioned at school, new name, consistent and insistent. His dysphoria has worsened since puberty began: failing grades, withdrawal, one ER visit for self-harm last spring. After eighteen months of assessment, the gender clinic has recommended puberty-suppressing medication. Riley’s mother supports it. His father is opposed, not hostile but afraid: “He’s fifteen. How can anyone know?”
You are the clinic nurse, and both parents ask what you think.
Note
Everyone in Room 4 wants Riley to flourish. His father is not a bigot, his mother is not reckless, and the clinicians are not ideologues. They disagree about something narrower and harder: what to do when you cannot be sure.
The evidence on gender medicine for minors is genuinely low-certainty, and low-certainty evidence does not automatically favor either side. “Don’t give irreversible treatment without strong proof it helps” and “don’t withhold possibly life-saving treatment without strong proof it harms” are both appeals to caution, pointed in opposite directions.
Ground rules for this topic: every position gets its strongest version, from the serious people who hold it. The lecture hands you tools; the conclusions stay yours.
By the end of Part A, you will be able to:
Sloppy vocabulary wrecks this conversation faster than any other in the course, so we fix terms first.
| Term | What it names |
|---|---|
| Sex | the biological package (chromosomes, gonads, anatomy) recorded at birth |
| Gender identity | a person’s internal, persistent sense of being male, female, or neither |
| Gender dysphoria | a clinical diagnosis: marked distress from the mismatch between the two, lasting at least six months |
Being transgender is not a disorder in the DSM. Distress is what medicine treats, and how best to treat it is the whole dispute. The diagnosis describes the present; it is not a prediction.
England’s youth gender service went from 210 referrals in 2011/12 to over 2,700 a year by 2018/19, now mostly birth-registered females in their early teens (Cass 2024).
Nobody has shown which reading is right.


Puberty blockers (GnRH agonists), in plain language
They pause the hormones of puberty. They were developed for precocious puberty (a seven-year-old entering puberty) and used for decades: stop the drug, and puberty proceeds. Open questions remain about bone density and brain development during a years-long pause.
The model came from Amsterdam in the 1990s, the Dutch protocol: carefully screened adolescents could have puberty paused, buying time before any permanent step.
The original group was small and tightly selected: childhood-onset dysphoria, stable, supportive families. The core dispute is whether those results transfer to today’s very different patients.
Reversible chemistry is not the same as a reversible path, and that is where the evidence fight begins.
The University of York ran systematic reviews for England’s Cass Review, the same machinery you met in research ethics. Their results matched earlier reviews in Sweden and Finland (Cass 2024).
Important
Low certainty does not mean “no effect.” It means the true effect may differ substantially from what studies suggest, in either direction. Much of pediatrics runs on low-certainty evidence. The usual reason to set a higher bar here: these treatments are partly irreversible and the patients are minors.
| The number | Read as success | Read as a warning |
|---|---|---|
| 87–98% of teens who start blockers go on to hormones (Brik et al. 2020; Carmichael et al. 2021) | screening works: those selected really needed transition | the “pause” is an on-ramp; consent to blockers is consent to more |
| About 1% regret, a figure often cited from older studies of adults | regret is rare | those adults were screened under stricter rules, many were lost to follow-up, and today’s teens may differ |
Same numbers, opposite lessons. What would settle it is the missing comparison: what would have happened without treatment.
“Just run a randomized trial” is the obvious answer. Recall research ethics: blinding is impossible (patients know whether puberty stopped), equipoise is disputed in both directions, and whoever picks the outcome measure half-decides the result.

“More research,” which every side endorses, is itself ethically hard. And “wait for evidence” is also a decision.
The disagreement reduces to a choice between two rules for acting under uncertainty.
| The precaution default | The access default | |
|---|---|---|
| The rule | no irreversible treatment for minors without strong evidence of benefit | no withholding treatment from suffering patients without strong evidence of harm |
| Treats which error as worse? | treating someone who would have changed course | denying someone who needed it |
| Burden of proof sits on | the treatment | the restriction |
Both defaults are caution, and the evidence is silent on exactly the question they answer. Choosing between them is an ethical act, one every authority, court, and philosopher in this debate has made.
Simona Giordano (2008) wrote the founding defense (Giordano 2008).
Florence Ashley (2019) went further and questioned the gatekeeping itself (Ashley 2019).
Moti Gorin (2024) asks: what is this care aiming at? (Gorin 2024)
Maura Priest (2019) scrambles the politics: teens should get blockers even over their parents’ objection (Priest 2019).
Gorin was also one of nine named contributors to the final (November 2025) version of the HHS report in the next section. Knowing who wrote a review is part of weighing it.
You know Joel Feinberg’s right to an open future from genomics: children have rights held in trust that adults must not close off (Feinberg 1980). In this debate, both sides use it.
Blockers keep the future open
Unwanted puberty closes options permanently: the deeper voice, the changed body. A pause holds every door open until the patient can choose as an adult.
The pathway closes it
If blockers work as an on-ramp (recall that continuation rate), the “pause” quietly closes the door to reconciling with one’s birth sex before the patient can know what an adult self would want.
Which reading is right depends on the factual question (pause or on-ramp?) that the evidence can’t yet answer.
Return to Room 4 and seat the four philosophers around Riley’s bed.
Note
Pediatric ethics has a name for the fight over Riley’s maturity: risk-relative capacity. The capacity a decision requires scales with its stakes. A 15-year-old can consent to a flu shot, but refusing chemotherapy triggers a very different process.
Both sides accept this and still disagree, because they disagree about which choice is the high-stakes one: starting blockers, or going through unwanted puberty. Risk-relative capacity doesn’t settle Riley’s case. It names what the disagreement is.
| Authority | Position | Standard invoked |
|---|---|---|
| AAP & Endocrine Society (U.S.) | affirming model; blockers and hormones after assessment | clinical consensus + observational studies |
| WPATH SOC8 (2022) | supports access; removed most minimum ages | consensus of the specialty field |
| Finland (2020), Sweden (2022) | psychosocial support first; medication exceptional | national evidence reviews |
| Cass Review (England, 2024) | extreme caution; blockers only within research | systematic reviews |
| HHS report (U.S., 2025) | psychotherapy first; questions the affirming model | evidence review; contributors named only in the final version |
Every row claims the evidence; the rows contradict. Note that the European turn began before Cass, in countries with no American-style culture war.
The Review (2024)
The critique, and a test of process
Back in Room 4, Riley’s father has done his reading. He puts the HHS 2025 report on the table (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2025): “The government reviewed everything. It says therapy first.” Riley’s mother puts the Endocrine Society guideline next to it: “The actual specialists disagree.”
Both documents are real. Both claim the evidence. They are looking at you.
Note
The distinction that organizes expert disputes: burden of proof versus standard of proof. Burden asks who must prove their case: the treatment, or the restriction? Standard asks how much evidence counts as enough.
The U.S. medical societies and the European reviews disagree about both, but their deepest split is the burden. Most “the evidence says” claims in this debate are burden-and-standard claims in disguise: value judgments wearing lab coats.

27 states ban this care for minors (courts have blocked two of those bans). 16 states and D.C., including Minnesota (outlined), have shield laws.
In June 2025 the Supreme Court upheld Tennessee’s ban, 6–3. The law sorts by age and medical purpose, not sex, the majority said, so only the most deferential review applied.
“We leave questions regarding its policy to the people, their elected representatives, and the democratic process.”
Chief Justice John Roberts, for the majority (Supreme Court of the United States 2025)
“By retreating from meaningful judicial review exactly where it matters most, the Court abandons transgender children and their families to political whims.”
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, dissenting
The Court decided who decides, not whether the bans are wise.

Carol M. Highsmith Archive, Library of Congress. Public domain.
Every framework, clinical, philosophical, and legal, hits the same wall: someone must draw an age line for partly irreversible treatment, under uncertainty.
Note
A final distinction: legal permission versus professional obligation. Law tells you what may be done where you stand; it never tells you what good care requires. After Skrmetti the two diverge state by state. A clinician in Memphis may believe care is needed that she legally cannot give; one in Minneapolis may legally give care she doubts. Conscience runs both ways.
Medicine has lived in this gap before, in the post-Dobbs exception cases. The skill is the same: know the law exactly, know your judgment honestly, and never confuse the two.
One question ran throughout: what should medicine, families, and the state do when evidence is low-certainty and the stakes are high in both directions? The reviews found weak evidence, and weak evidence licenses neither default. That is why the philosophers can share the data and split on the ethics, and why Feinberg’s open future lands on both sides of the same bed. The authorities split the same way. Skrmetti then handed the dispute to legislatures, leaving clinicians in a state-by-state patchwork.
Paired case: U.S. v. Skrmetti: the arguments on both sides, and what happened after the ruling.
Recall
State what the York systematic reviews concluded about puberty blockers and hormones, and explain, using the precaution and access defaults, why both sides claim that finding supports them.
Apply
Pediatric melatonin for sleep, off-label stimulant doses, and many NICU treatments also rest on low-certainty evidence. Pick one, run it through the two-defaults table, and identify what, if anything, makes the gender-care case relevantly different.
Debate
Cass recommended puberty blockers be available only within research trials, and then the trial itself stalled. Is “research-only access” a principled middle path or a ban in disguise? Defend your answer using equipoise.
Bioethics OER · CC BY-NC 4.0 · Brendan Shea