
Part B: Industrial Animals, Xenotransplantation, and the Frontier
An Introduction to Bioethics.
Here are four ways humans use animals. Put them in order, from most defensible to least:
Then answer:
Note
Most people rank the pig-heart transplant as more troubling than the bacon. Hold that intuition up to the light.
By the end of today, we’ll have a tool that ranks animal uses by three things — scale, necessity, and benefit — and on that tool, the everyday cheeseburger comes out worse than the high-tech transplant. Whether you accept that result, or reject the tool, is the work of this lecture.
In Part A we asked which beings have moral status and met five answers — Kant, Singer, Regan, Cohen, Korsgaard. We saw that the 3 Rs and the IACUC try to shrink and police the harm of research.
Today we leave the lab. The same views now have to handle the two largest and most advanced uses of animals: the food system that kills tens of billions, and the gene-edited pigs now keeping humans alive.
By the end of Part B, you will be able to:
Whatever you think of eating meat, start with the number.
The scale matters morally: a practice repeated 80 billion times needs a justification 80 billion times as strong.
Socially Responsible Agricultural Project, via Wikimedia Commons. CC BY 4.0.
Each of those barns holds thousands of animals that will never go outside. This is what 80 billion a year requires.
The welfare case is not the only case. Factory farming is also a public-health problem — which means even a strictly human-centered ethics has to reckon with it.
The pig in the barn and the patient whose antibiotics no longer work are linked by the same practice.
The second human cost is the one we just lived through.
The convergence. Kant and Cohen grant animals no rights — yet their human-centered view still condemns a system that breeds resistant bacteria and pandemic flu.
Welfare reasons and self-interested human reasons point the same way here. That is rare, and worth noticing.
A hospital you work at sources its cafeteria meat from conventional industrial farms. A nurses’ group proposes switching to higher-welfare, antibiotic-free suppliers — at higher cost, paid from the same budget that funds patient programs.
Note
A distinction the food case forces: direct vs. indirect harm.
The factory farm harms the pig directly — that is the welfare wrong. It also harms humans indirectly, through resistant bacteria and new viruses — a second, separate wrong with different victims.
Why this matters: the two harms come apart. A reform could ease the public-health harm (ban growth-promoter antibiotics) while leaving the welfare harm untouched — and vice versa. Knowing which harm a policy fixes keeps you from claiming credit for both.
Part A defended research by its benefits. But a benefit you don’t get can’t justify a harm — and animal models often don’t deliver.
The translation gap turns a scientific fact into a moral one.

For the first time, law is moving away from mandatory animal testing.
Balance matters: the phase-out is a goal, not a finished capability.
So the debate is no longer “research: yes or no?” It is how fast we can replace it, and who bears the risk of moving before the alternatives are proven.
Singer and Regan both welcome replacement — for different reasons. Less suffering; fewer rights violated.
The pressure behind it is a body count of a different kind.
The breakthrough was genetic, not surgical. CRISPR lets researchers edit a pig so its organs survive in a human body.
A transplant pig may carry a dozen or more edits — some removing pig features the body attacks, some adding human ones it accepts.
The era of human xenotransplantation began in 2022 and is moving fast — fast enough that this chart needs checking every term.
Each patient was out of options. Each result taught the field something — and each death raised the question of whether the attempt was justified.
| Patient | Year | Organ | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| David Bennett | 2022 | pig heart | lived ~2 months; first in a living human (Griffith et al. 2022) |
| Lawrence Faucette | 2023 | pig heart | lived ~6 weeks |
| Rick Slayman | 2024 | pig kidney | first in a living patient; lived ~2 months |
| Towana Looney | 2024–25 | pig kidney | organ removed after 130 days |
| Tim Andrews | 2025–26 | pig kidney | 271 days — longest to date; then received a human kidney |
Two things changed the question in 2025–26.
1. It stopped being a series of one-offs and became a clinical trial. In 2025 the FDA cleared the first true xenotransplant trials. Two companies, two strategies: United Therapeutics (the EXPAND study, using a 10-gene-edited pig kidney; first patient transplanted at NYU Langone in November 2025) and eGenesis (a 69-gene-edited pig kidney). Until now, every patient was an individual rescue attempt under compassionate-use rules. A trial means enrollment criteria, controls, and — crucially — patients who are not out of options in quite the same way. Recall the Chapter 3 vocabulary: this is the moment xenotransplantation acquires a clinical equipoise problem it did not previously have.
2. Tim Andrews crossed a bridge. Andrews, a 67-year-old retired engineer from New Hampshire, received a 69-gene-edited pig kidney in January 2025. He lived with it 271 days — surpassing Looney’s 130 — before declining function forced its removal in October 2025 and he returned to dialysis (CNN 2025). Then, in January 2026, he received a human kidney (CNN 2026).
That last step reframes the entire enterprise. If a pig organ can keep someone alive and off dialysis long enough to reach a human transplant, then xenotransplantation may not need to be a permanent replacement to be worth doing. It could be a bridge — the way a ventricular assist device bridges a patient to a heart. A bridge is a far easier ethical case to make than a cure: it needs to work for months, not decades.
Write or discuss: Does reframing xeno organs as a bridge rather than a destination change whether Bennett’s 2022 surgery was justified? Does it change what you must tell the next patient in the consent conversation?
Three problems set xenotransplantation apart from an ordinary transplant.
David Bennett received his pig heart under an FDA “compassionate use” exception — he was too sick for the transplant waitlist. He lived two months. His son said the family hoped the attempt would “help future patients.”
Here is the tool promised at the start. Rank an animal use by three questions.
A use scores badly when it is high-scale, unnecessary, and low-benefit — and well when it is low-scale, necessary, and high-benefit.
| Use | Scale | Necessity | Benefit | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Factory-farmed bacon | tens of billions | easily avoided | taste / cost | worst |
| Cosmetic rabbit test | millions | avoidable (alternatives exist) | vanity product | bad |
| Pig-heart transplant | one pig | no alternative | a human life | best |
| Smarter lab mouse | few | — | research gain, but… | (see frontier) |
Read the top and bottom rows together: the everyday cheeseburger scores worse than the headline-grabbing transplant.
This is the result that unsettles people — and it is perfectly consistent.
The lesson: “creepy” and “wrong” are different properties. Novelty triggers disgust; ethics tracks suffering, necessity, and benefit.
The rights view from Part A refuses the whole exercise — and that refusal is the strongest objection to the ledger.
The Rights Objection to the Ledger
After Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights
For Regan, the ledger commits the original sin of utilitarianism: it prices a life that should be off the market. Where you land depends on the theory you brought from Part A.
The fourth row of the ledger needs its own treatment, because it changes the rules.
Uplifting turns the moral-status question back on us.
We would be manufacturing the very thing that obligates us — creating a creature, then owing it more because of what we made it.
Korsgaard’s “fellow creatures” compounds the worry: uplifting could create fellows we never intended to have.
The pieces are not hypothetical.
A lab proposes engineering mice with substantially human-like memory and problem-solving, to make Alzheimer’s research more accurate. The mice would be smarter — and, by Part A’s own criteria, would have higher moral status.
Note
A new distinction the frontier forces: moral status as discovered vs. created.
All of Part A treated status as something we discover — we investigate an animal and find out how much it matters. Uplifting and chimeras make status something we can create: we decide, in the lab, how much a being will matter, and thereby how much we’ll owe it.
That is genuinely new in ethics. We are used to asking “what do we owe this creature?” We are not used to choosing, in advance, how much we’ll be obligated — and then building the creature to match.
The moral-status question runs under half this course. Each chapter offered a criterion — and each one can be aimed at animals.
We’ll walk three of these, because each changes its verdict when the patient is a pig.
Don Marquis argued abortion is wrong because it deprives the fetus of a future like ours — a future of valuable experiences (Marquis 1989). The fetus isn’t conscious yet, but it has that future to lose.
Now apply it. A healthy pig also has a future of experiences it values — and the transplant ends it.
Two more callbacks, stated briefly so you can carry them into discussion.
From genetics. We worried about creating a savior sibling — a child conceived to donate to another. A transplant pig is engineered, born, and killed to be used. Is “made to be used” worse for a person than for a pig — and is creating a life for parts different from taking one?
From end of life. We let humans accept risk or death for others (research subjects, living donors). The pig’s death is killing for benefit, without consent. Is that worse than the risks we let humans choose — or does the pig’s inability to consent change the kind of act it is?
We ranked four uses of animals and built a tool — scale, necessity, benefit — that reorders our intuitions: the industrial cheeseburger comes out worse than the gene-edited pig heart, and a critic of factory farming like Singer can consistently accept xenotransplantation. Regan’s rights view refuses the ranking entirely, which is why the verdict still depends on the theory you hold. Along the way the food system showed how animal harm and human harm converge — antibiotic resistance, pandemics — and the frontier of uplifting showed we can now create the moral status we then must honor. The threads from abortion, genetics, and end-of-life all reach the same pig, and none of them lets us off easily.
The whole lecture comes down to one operating room and one desperate patient.
Paired case: David Bennett and the First Pig-Heart Transplant
Recall
Name the three factors in the scale–necessity–benefit ledger, and use them to explain why factory-farmed bacon ranks worse than a pig-heart transplant.
Apply
A company wants to gene-edit chickens to grow faster and resist a barn virus, cutting both cost and antibiotic use. Run it through the ledger and through the direct/indirect-harm distinction. Where does it help, and whom?
Debate
If we could uplift research animals to get better data, should we — knowing that doing so raises their moral status and our duties to them? Defend a yes or a no.
Bioethics OER · CC BY-NC 4.0 · Brendan Shea